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Abstract
This paper deals with the deuteros plous, literally ‘the second voyage’, proverbially ‘the 
next best way’, discussed in Plato’s Phaedo, the key passage being Phd. 99e4-100a3. 
I argue that (a) the ‘flight into the logoi’ can have two different interpretations, a stan-
dard one and a non-standard one. The issue is whether at 99e-100a Socrates means 
that both the student of erga and the student of logoi consider images (‘the standard 
interpretation’), or the student of logoi does not consider images (‘the non-standard 
interpretation’); (b) the non-standard one implies the problem of the hypothesis, a 
problem analogous to the problem of the elenchus; (c) there is a structural analogy be-
tween Descartes’ ontological argument for the existence of God in his 5th Meditation 
and the final proof for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo.
Keywords
Plato – Phaedo – deuteros plous – immortality of the soul – ontological argument for 
the existence of God
Plato’s Socrates uses the term δεύτερος πλοῦς (Phd. 99c9-d1) in connection with 
his intellectual autobiography. His mental history led him away from that ‘wis-
dom’ (sophia) they call ‘the study of nature’ (φύσεως ἱστορία, Phd. 96a8) to look 
at ‘the truth of things’ (τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν) in the logoi (Phd. 99e6). He 
compares this move to a flight—the ‘flight into the logoi’—and calls this ‘flight 
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into the logoi’ the ‘second voyage’ (δεύτερος πλοῦς, Phd. 99c9-d1). The decisive 
passage runs as follows:
[S1] ἔδοξε δή μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν 
ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν.
[S2] ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν;
[S3] οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι 
μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν ἔργοις.1
Preliminary translation:
[S1] So I decided that I must take refuge in the logoi and look at the truth 
of things in them.
[S2] However, perhaps this image is inadequate;
[S3] for I do not altogether admit that one who investigates things by 
means of logoi is dealing with images more than one who looks at 
realities.
First (1.) I will give a non-standard interpretation of this passage, then (2.) I will 
proceed to the philosophical problem of the passage according to this inter-
pretation, and (3.) I will apply the philosophical problem to the final proof of 
immortality and draw an analogy with the ontological argument in Descartes’ 
Meditations (AT VII, 67) for the existence of God. I conclude with some re-
marks on the philosophical aspect of this flight into the logoi and the validity 
of the ontological arguments for the immortality of the soul and the existence 
of God.
 1
The correct meaning of the proverbial expression δεύτερος πλοῦς has been 
indicated by Eustathios from Thessaloniki (ca. 1110-ca. 1195) by referring to 
Pausanias: δεύτερος πλοῦς means ‘the next best way’, that is, the way of those 
who try another method if the first does not succeed, namely those who ‘try 
oars when the wind fails according to Pausanias’ (Eust. p. 1453).2 There has 
1   Pl. Phd. 99e4-100a3, tr. Grube with modification.
2   Cf. Burnet, 1911, ad loc.; cf. LSJ s.v.; Martinelli Tempesta 2003, 89: “… il significato del celebre 
proverbio utilizzato da Platone in Phd. 99c-d può essere soltanto quello … di second best, 
come è suggerito inequivocabilmente da tutte le testimoninanze antiche”. Ibid. 123-125 is also 
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been some dispute about whether this is really Plato’s intended meaning and 
whether the expression is not used by Plato in an ironic way here,3 that is, if 
the second best is not the second best, but the best voyage for the Platonic 
Socrates. But after the study of Martinelli Tempesta, who insists that the ex-
pression δεύτερος πλοῦς is proverbial and not to be confused with a metaphor,4 
there can be no reasonable doubt that its meaning is that of a second voyage, 
not only in the chronological5 but also in the evaluative sense of inferiority 
(δευτερότης) to the first voyage, and that it is not used here in an ironic way,6 
as it is not used in an ironic sense in the two other occurrences in Plato (Phlb. 
19c2-3; Plt. 300c2) and Aristotle (cf. EN 2.9, 1109a34-35; Pol. 3.11, 1284b19). In fact, 
the related comparison of the Socratic enterprise with a ‘raft’ (Phd. 85d1)— 
instead of a boat—is also not used in an ironic way (unless it is not ‘simple’ but 
‘complex’ irony).
a useful index of the passages where the expression δεύτερος πλοῦς is used in a proverbial 
way; he argues on 108-109 (pace Kanayama 2000, 88-99) against the interpretation of Plb. 
Hist. 8.36.6.2 B.–W. that the δεύτερος πλοῦς means merely the safer voyage second in time. 
Cf. note 5.
3   Cf. Burnet 1911, ad loc.: “In any case, Socrates does not believe for a moment that the method 
he is about to describe is a pis aller or ‘makeshift’”. Gadamer 1968, 254: “Ein sehr ironisch-
er Passus. Ich habe schon in meinem oben abgedruckten Buche 1931 ausgeführt, wie weit 
gerade die Erforschung des Seienden in den Logoi der Zugang zur Wahrheit des Seienden 
ist …”. Gadamer seems not to see the problem: how the Socratic logoi—esp. the hypothesis 
of ideas—can lead not only to consistency but also to truth, nor does he distinguish between 
‘simple’ and ‘complex’ irony. Cf. also Thanassas 2003, 10: “The ‘images of logoi’ are the only 
means at our disposal for approaching the truth of beings”. But the hypothesis of ideas is 
not an image. Cf. for the distinction between ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ irony Vlastos 1991, 31: “In 
‘simple’ irony what is said just isn’t what is meant: taken in its ordinary, commonly under-
stood, sense that statement is simply false. In ‘complex’ irony what is said is and isn’t what is 
meant: its surface content is meant to be true in one sense, false in another”. For Gadamer’s 
interpretation of the Philebus in 1931, cf. Ferber 2010.
4   “‘Deuteros plous’ is not a metaphor, but just a proverb. In my view, they are two different 
kinds of expressions: the proverb has a single and fixed meaning which is always the same, 
while we can use a word or an expression in different metaphorical ways. Of course a proverb 
can be used as a metaphor of something else, but it is its sole meaning that can refer to some-
thing else, which is implied by its not equivocal meaning” (Letter from 25.02.2018, quoted 
with permission of the author).
5   Cf. the scholium quoted in Greene 1938, 14: “Since those who failed in the prior voyage (prote-
ros plous) prepare the second safely, the proverb ‘second voyage’ is said about those who do 
something safely”, quoted in Kanayama 2000, 88-89, esp. 89: “According to this reading, ‘sec-
ond’ means only ‘second in time’ and there is no implication of the inferiority of the second 
voyage relative to the prior one; it rather suggests that the second voyage is better than the 
prior in being a safer voyage”.
6   Cf. already Murphy 1936, 41 n. 1; Hackforth 1955, 127 n. 5.
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This ‘second voyage’ stands in contrast to the ‘first’ (πρῶτος). Although 
Socrates does not use the expression ‘first voyage’ (πρῶτος πλοῦς), the first voy-
age is mirrored in his intellectual autobiography as a former student of natural 
sciences (Phd. 95a-99d). It was a method by which he hoped to get direct access 
to reality, a process ending in disappointment:7 it led to complete blindness of 
the soul, that is, complete ignorance (cf. Phd. 99e2-3), because of its bewilder-
ing effect (cf. Phd. 79c7). In contrast to the ‘first voyage’, the ‘second voyage’ 
has the advantage of being the safer (ἀσφαλέστερον) course (cf. Lg. 897e1-2), 
although slower and more laborious than the first. Thus, the second voyage 
implies a change of the means or method but not of the goal, that is, ‘to look 
at the truth of things’ (σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν, Phd. 99e5-6). This goal 
‘of the second best voyage in search for the cause’ (τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν 
τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν, Phd. 99c9-d1) implies that the Platonic Socrates investigated 
the ‘true’ (ἀληθῶς, Phd. 98e1) or ‘real’ (τῷ ὄντι, Phd. 99b2) cause, that is, the final 
or second-order cause of the mechanical causes, which are only necessary (cf. 
Phd. 99b3) or ‘co-causes’ (συναίτια, cf. Phd. 98c2-e1; Ti. 46c7)—‘that would di-
rect everything and arrange each thing in such a way as would be best’ (Phd. 
97c5-6). Thus, Socrates starts from the anti-naturalistic assumption that nature 
has a teleological structure and that the ‘study of nature’ should explain this 
structure, a project to be realized by Plato later in the Timaeus (cf. Ti. 30a2-7).
But can we say in more detail what this ‘second best voyage’ involves? 
According to [S1], it is a flight from direct perception or vision of ‘the things’ 
(τὰ πράγματα, Phd. 99e3) to the indirect method of the use of logoi, which 
contrast with ‘the things’. Plato’s Socrates uses here a commonly accepted way 
of thinking, which we also find for example in the Apology (cf. 32a4-5) and 
Seventh Letter (cf. 343c2-3), but then changes what is normally believed, name-
ly that logoi are empty talks (ἀδολεσχία, cf. Phd. 70c1, Prm. 135d5, Tht. 195b10; 
κενεαγορία, R. 607b7), and turns it into an interesting philosophical claim, 
which is at odds with what is normally believed. The common contrast is be-
tween the realities (τὰ ὄντα, Phd. 99e5)8 and mere talk (οἱ λόγοι). The Socratic 
claim is that the things that are commonly believed to be the realities are not 
true realities, and that attention to ‘mere talk’ can lead us to the true realities. 
So, what looks like a way that leads far off from reality turns out to be just 
the way to the true realities. It is—so to speak—the Socratic turning away 
7   With Goodrich 1902, 382, I assume that τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν (cf. Phd. 100a2) “must refer to the 
physical speculations previously described and condemned”; therefore I prefer the first of 
the three interpretations of the ‘first voyage’, mentioned by Kanayama 2000, 95 n. 112. The 
best overview of what belongs to Plato’s and what to Socrates’ mental history is to be found 
in Hackforth 1955, 127-130.
8   Cf. Burnet 1911, ad loc.: “ta onta like ta pragmata”.
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from ‘the study of nature’ towards the study of what we say (διαλέγεσθαι, cf. 
Phd. 63c7-8). Although the Platonic Socrates does not yet use the substantive 
‘dialectical pursuit’ (διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος, R. 533c7),9 he speaks nevertheless of 
‘another form of pursuit’ (ἄλλος τρόπος τῆς μεθόδου, Phd. 97b6-7) to find out 
‘the reasons of each thing—why it comes into being, why it perishes, why it 
exists’ (Phd. 96a9-10, tr. Rowe), namely ‘the art concerning the logoi’ (ἡ περὶ 
τοὺς λόγους τέχνη, Phd. 90b7). To this art he may have already alluded when 
he speaks of a ‘path’ or ‘by-way’: ‘It looks as if there’s a by-way (ἀτραπός) that’ll 
bring us and our reasoning safely through in our search (ἐν τῇ σκέψει)’ (Phd. 
66b3-4, tr. Rowe with modifications, cf. Plt. 258c3). If it is not the straight way, 
then the by-way brings us “on to the trail in our hunt after truth”.10 This ‘by-way’ 
anticipates ‘another form of pursuit’ (ἄλλος τρόπος τῆς μεθόδου, Phd. 97b6-7) for 
which the Platonic Socrates then uses the proverbial expression ‘second voy-
age’. But both expressions—‘by-way’ and ‘second voyage’—indicate second-
choice options to reach the goal. For these ‘second-choice options’ Socrates 
gives no explicit affirmative theoretical definition (by genus and difference), 
but a negative contextual one when he distinguishes it (a) from the ‘first voy-
age’ of Ionian natural philosophy because it makes no use of sense percep-
tion or proceeds a priori and (b) from ‘antilogic’, that is, arguments that aim 
merely at contradiction (ἀντιλογικοὶ λόγοι, Phd. 90c1, cf. 101e2, Ar. Nu. 1173). He 
describes it positively as a method of ‘giving an account of being’ (λόγον διδοναι 
τοῦ εἶναι), that is, a λόγος τῆς οὐσίας by the method of question and answer 
(ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, Phd. 78d1-2).11
According to these negative contextual definitions, the ‘second voyage’ is 
not to be identified immediately with (a) the hypothetical method or (b) the 
theory of forms or (c) the explanation of things in terms of formal causes.12 
But we may ask if this ‘dialectical turn’ of Socrates leads to (a) the hypothetical 
method or (b) the theory of forms or (c) the explanation of things in terms of 
formal causes as defended by Rose.13 (In fact, it leads—in my opinion—in-
directly to all of them, namely the hypothesis of forms, which explains the 
characteristics of things by formal causes.) It is—if we may disregard here for 
a moment Parmenides, DK B3—the first expression of what has later been 
called ‘metaphysics’14 in the sense of giving an account of invisible things for 
9    Cf. for an interpretation Ferber 1989, 102.
10   Burnet 2011, ad loc. Cf. for this difficult passage Burnet 2011, 35-36; Dixsaut 1991, 332 n. 83; 
Trabattoni 2011, 41 n. 49; Casertano 2015, 292-293.
11   Cf. Burnet 1911, ad loc.
12   Cf. Rose 1966, 466-477; Preus and Ferguson 1969, 105.
13   Rose 1966, 473.
14   Cf. Reale 1997, 137-158.
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which no experience by our sensory organs is possible. We may therefore also 
call this ‘flight’ from ‘wisdom’ (σοφία), which they call ‘the study of nature’ 
(φύσεως ἱστορία, Phd. 96a8), Socrates’ ‘dialectical turn’ in the sense of Socrates’ 
‘meta-physical turn’.
On the meaning of the word λόγοι in Phd. 100a1, which is “not easy to 
translate”,15 we do not have an equivalent word in our European languages. 
Plato may use the word in Phd. 100a1 in a non-technical way as in Phd. 59a4 in 
the sense of ‘discussions’ (Grube’s translation). But his “definiteness of inten-
tion”, to use an expression of Arne Naess, may be more subtle in [S1].16 In fact, 
there has been a great variety of other translations.17 I subdivide them into 
non-sentential and sentential translations and the sentential translations into 
mono-sentential, poly-sentential and ambiguous translations. Non-sentential 
translations are ‘Begriffe, conceptos’ (Apelt/Horn/Gual), ‘ideas’ (Jowett). But 
as Burnet has remarked: “The term logos cannot possibly mean ‘concept’. So far 
as there is any Greek word for ‘concept’ at this date, it is noêma”.18 Ambiguous 
translations are ‘rationes’ (Ficino), ‘Gedanken’ (Schleiermacher/Rufener) or 
‘raisonnement’ (Dixsaut) which do not render the linguistic aspect of logoi 
(cf. Cra. 431b5-c1; Tht. 189e4-6, 202b3-5; Sph. 264a8-9) and leave open whether 
these ‘rationes’ or ‘Gedanken’ or ‘raisonnement’, when expressed in sentences, 
are mono- or poly-sentential. Mono-sentential translations are ‘definitions’ 
(Bluck), ‘propositions’ or ‘statements’ (Ross/Kanayama), ‘postulati’ (Reale), or 
‘Grund-Sätze’ (Natorp). So Ross writes: “The language of ‘agreement’, and the 
fact that what Plato calls the ‘strongest logoi’ is the proposition that Ideas exist, 
shows that logoi means statements or propositions”.19
But with the flight into the logoi, Plato also looks back to the Crito, where he 
describes his Socrates as ‘the kind of man who listens only to the logos [that 
is, the argument] that on reflection seems best (βέλτιστος) to me’ (Cri. 46b4-
6). Later on, in the Parmenides, young Socrates’ eager desire ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους 
(cf. Prm. 135d3) implies also a zeal for logoi in the sense of arguments. In the 
section on μισολογία (Phd. 89d4), Socrates uses the word also in the sense of ar-
guments (cf. Phd. 90b4.6.7.c1.4). Therefore, the ‘mono-sentential’ translations 
with ‘statements’ or ‘propositions’ may be replaced with ‘poly-sentential’ ones, 
not with ‘discussions’ (Grube), because discussions may not contain any ar-
guments, but with ‘arguments’ (Hackforth) or ‘theories’ (Tredennick, Gallop) 
15   Burnet 1911, ad loc.
16   Naess, 1952, 256ff.
17   For a selection, cf. e.g. Murphy 1936, 40; Casertano 2015, 360-362.
18   Burnet 1914, 317 n. 1. So Loriaux 1975, 93: “… dès 99e5, tous logous vise plus que de simples 
‘notions’”.
19   Ross 1951, 27.
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or ‘reasoned accounts’ (Rowe), for theories or reasoned accounts contain 
arguments.20 Nevertheless, we can maintain the translation ‘propositions’ 
when we translate λόγοι with Ebert as premises of theories, for premises of 
theories are propositions.21 Thus, I try to elucidate the intended meaning by 
translating logoi in the following way:
[S1]: ‘So I thought I must take refuge in theories and their premises, and in-
vestigate the truth of things in them’.
[S2] makes an addition and qualification: he declares the comparison with 
the sight of the reflection of the sun in water to be an image (εἰκάζω) and 
qualifies the image as being in some sense inadequate. What is in some sense 
inadequate about this image? To see reality through an image suggests indirect 
access to reality; however, as Hackforth remarks: “[The image] is a good paral-
lel in so far as the contrast of direct and indirect apprehension goes; but in so 
far as it might imply that logoi stand to physical objects (erga) in the relation of 
images to real things, it is misleading”.22
[S3] is indeed “misleading” or “confusing”.23 It can have (in my opinion) at 
least two different interpretations. I call these the standard24 and the non-
standard or astonishing interpretations.25 In the first interpretation Socrates 
pursues the parallel; in the second he withdraws it at least in a certain sense. 
The issue is whether Socrates means that (a) both—the student of erga and 
the student of logoi—consider the ‘truth of things’ in images, because logoi 
are also images (‘the standard interpretation’), or (b) the student of logoi does 
not consider ‘the truth of things’ in images, because logoi are not eo ipso im-
ages of the ‘truth of things’, but have to be only consistent (‘the non-standard 
interpretation’).
20   Cf. Murphy 1936, 40-41: “… logoi are verbally contrasted with erga, and perhaps some word 
like ‘theories’, though it is not an exact equivalent, would bring out this contrast, …”.
21   Cf. Ebert 2004, 350: “Die logoi, die Sokrates im Auge hat, sind also offenbar Teile von 
Argumenten oder allgemeiner von Schlüssen, sind aber selbst keine Argumente oder 
Schlüsse. Sie haben den Status von Prämissen, aber nicht den von Schlüssen”.
22   Hackforth 1955, 137 mentioned in Frede 1999, 121 n. 29.
23   Gallop 1975, 178: “The sentence [S3] in which Socrates qualifies his comparison of ‘theo-
ries’ with images (a1-2) is confusing in translation.” Cf. the different translations in the 
appendix. But the sentence is also confusing in Greek.
24   The standard interpretation has been defended, e.g. by Gallop 1975, 178; Bostock 1986, 157-
162; Gadamer 1968, 254; Gonzalez 1998, 188-208; Thanassas 2003; Dancy 2004, 295; Costa 
2017, 141.
25   The non-standard interpretation has been defended, e.g. by Burnet 1911, ad loc.: “It is not 
really the case that the logoi are mere images of ta onta or ta pragmata”. Dixsaut 1991, 
140: “Saisir une réalité à travers un discours réflexif, ce n’est pas n’en saisir qu’une image. 
Au contraire, c’est l’expérience concrète qui ne livre que l’image de la chose, alors que la 
réflexion accède à sa réalité véritable”, Kanayama 2000, 47.
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In the standard interpretation, the indirect way of theories is not inferior 
to the direct way, because theories are also images of reality, namely ‘pictures 
in words’ (cf. Cra. 431ab2-c2),26 as the image of the sun in water is an image of 
the real sun. Logoi or theories, which depict (εἰκάζειν) real things, would then 
be on the same level as what Socrates later called εἰκασία, that is, conjecture 
through images, or—more exactly—through images of images (cf. R. 511e2, 
534a1-5; cf. also R. 598b6-8).27 As the sun seen ‘in water or some such reflection’ 
(Phd. 99d8-e1, my translation) is an image of the real phenomenon, so logoi 
would be images of realities. Then the upshot of Socrates’ flight into the logoi 
is that theories as images of reality are inadequate—even if they are “images 
of a higher grade than objects in the sensible world, and thus closer to Forms”.28 
Socrates would then in some sense anticipate Wittgenstein’s picture-theory of 
language and thought: “The picture is a model of [phenomenal] reality” (TLP 
2.12). As “a model of [phenomenal] reality”, a picture is not an exact represen-
tation of phenomenal reality.
In the non-standard interpretation, [S3] makes the claim that the indirect 
way of theories is nevertheless not inferior to the direct way of vision; the indi-
rect way does not use logoi in the sense of images, whereas the reflection of the 
sun in water is an image of the real sun.
The standard interpretation, however, involves the following problems: 
(a) it insinuates that the Platonic Socrates treats logoi like images—or even 
εἰκασίαι—that is, conjectures through images of images; (b) it insinuates that 
these conjectures posit ideas and then (c) assumes the logical impossibility 
that the logoi which posit ideas (cf. Phd. 100b5) depict first what they then 
posit; (d) it leaves open the question about what false logoi, which misrepre-
sent ‘the truth of things’, depict; and (e) nowhere in the Phaedo are ‘objects in 
the sensible world’ called explicitly ‘images of Forms’.29
26   I owe this reference to Cra. 431b2-c2 to Costa 2017, 28. Costa is anticipated by Bostock 
1986, 160, who gives the following caveat: “However, it is not even clear that this (rather 
confused) line of thought was Plato’s own view at the time when he wrote the Cratylus. 
This is partly because the dialogue goes on to reject the premiss that names need to be 
rightly framed (434c-435c), and partly because there are evidently many things in that 
dialogue that Plato is not very serious about, and the way the argument is extended from 
names to propositions may well be one of them”. Quoted without footnote.
27   Cf. Ferber 1989, 85-91 and 111-114.
28   Gallop 1975, 178.
29   Cf. for anticipations of the interpretatio difficilior Natorp 1903, 156; 2004, 167: “For logic is 
not something like a mere organ or instrument with which to grasp the ‘existing’ objects 
to be found outside us; it is not merely the eye-glass that protects from blinding, in order 
that we may look with impunity at the externally existing being of sensible things that ra-
diates in the sunlight, so to speak, of immediate truth in itself. This simile is defective for 
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But let us (f) nevertheless assume that the standard view is right: what, 
then, would have been the ‘philosopher’s progress’ if the Platonic Socrates 
turns from the old method of observation of facts to the new one of logoi as 
inadequate images of facts? Would in this case Socrates not merely turn from 
blindness to inexactness or even confusion and his ‘progress’ be a regress— 
to the malicious joy (Schadenfreude) of his enemies?
Since I do not allow this joy to his enemies, I prefer the non-standard inter-
pretation. In fact, the Socrates who turns to logoi in the sense of theories and 
their premises is not simply looking at reflections: the criterion of consistency 
(συμφωνία) which logoi have to fulfil (Phd. 100a5) suggests that logoi are not 
just images or reflections of real things in the sense of the correspondence 
theory of truth, but that συμφωνία or “consistency should suffice for truth”.30 In 
fact we read:
but in any case this was my starting point: hypothesizing (ὑποθέμενος) 
on each occasion whatever account I judge to have the most explana-
tory power, I posit as true (ἀληθῆ ὄντα) whatever seems to me in tune 
(συμφωνεῖν) with this …
Phd.100a3-4, tr. Rowe
So in the non-standard interpretation logoi are not images of real things, but 
are posited as true even if they are only in tune or consistent with each other.
In this non-standard interpretation, Socrates will, as in the standard inter-
pretation, “not admit that discussion is a less direct approach to truth than 
sense”31 or, more exactly, “not altogether admit that his method of studying 
things is less direct than that of the physicists …”.32 But the non-standard in-
terpretation gives quite a different twist to these words than the common one 
does: the physicists study things ἐν ἔργοις, that is, in reality.33 Socrates studies 
things ἐν λόγοις, that is, in the premises of theories. If Socrates “will not alto-
gether admit that his indirect method of studying things is less direct than that 
it is not the logical shape of being that is merely a copy …” (tr. Politis/Connolly). Murphy 
1936, 43: “the λόγοι are in no sense like the things being studied, and it becomes equally 
clear as we read on that the λόγοι are not λόγοι of the things…. But surely they are inde-
pendent propositions and thoughts introduced ab extra”. Λόγοι (and hypotheses) are for 
Socrates not on the same level as images or εἰκασίαι, cf. R. 511d6-4.
30   Vlastos 1991, 15.
31   Shorey 1933, 131.
32   Ross 1953, 27.
33   Robin 1950, XLIX: “L’expression ἐν ἔργοις, … fait penser à l’ἐνέργεια d’Aristote: acte qui est 
à la fois forme logique et réalité; qui, à l’état pur, est Dieu même”.
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of the physicists”, then his indirect method is not less direct than that of the 
physicists. If it is not less direct, it is at least on an equal footing to the physi-
cists’ method of getting at the truth of things. In the words of Kanayama: “[A]
n enquirer who studies his objects in logoi studies them as directly and clearly 
as those who study in concrete, and what’s more, without any fear of being 
blinded by the employment of the senses”.34
 2
The question—not asked by Kanayama—now arises: how is it possible that 
the indirect way of arguments is on an equal footing with the more direct 
way of seeing, that is: τὸ σκοπεῖν ἐν λόγοις τὰ ὄντα is on equal footing with τὸ 
σκοπεῖν τὰ ὄντα ἐν ἔργοις? This problem is analogous to the problem that Vlastos 
called “the problem of the elenchus”;35 let us call it the problem of the hypoth-
esis, that is—to use an expression from the pseudo-Platonic Definitions— 
the problem of the ‘unproved principle’ (ἀρχὴ ἀναπόδεικτος, Def. 415b10).
In distinction to the elenchus of Plato’s Socrates in the early dialogues, the 
Platonic Socrates of the Phaedo does not start from premises or hypotheses 
(hypotheseis) made by the interlocutor (cf. e.g. Euthphr. 11c4-5; Hp.Ma. 302c12; 
Grg. 454c4-5) to which he is not committed, but from his own to which he is 
committed. Nevertheless, the ‘problem of the elenchus’ persists in the prob-
lem of the hypothesis or ‘unproved principle’. For all the theories can do is 
to arrive—like Plato’s Socrates and his interlocutors in the early dialogues at 
ὁμολογία (cf. e.g. Chrm. 157c6-7; Ly. 219c4; Grg. 487e6-7)—at συμφωνία, that is, 
‘harmony’ or ‘concord’ (cf. Phd. 100a5). The expression συμφωνία or ‘concord’ 
has been made more precise by Robinson here and at 101d5 by distinguishing 
‘consistency’ from deducibility (cf. Prt. 333a6-8; Grg. 457e1-3; Phdr. 270c6-7).36
I cannot enter here into the logical problems which the translations ‘con-
sistency’ and ‘deducibility’ offer.37 I make only the following point concerning 
34   Kanayama 2000, 47.
35   Vlastos 1983, 38-39: “[T]he question then becomes how Socrates can claim, … to have 
proved that the refutand is false, when all he has established is the inconsistency of p 
with premisses whose truth he has not undertaken to establish in that argument: they 
have entered the argument simply as propositions on which he and the interlocutor are 
agreed. This is the problem of the Socratic elenchus …”.
36   Robinson 1953, 131.
37   Cf. Robinson 1953, 126-136. But cf. Kahn 1996, 316: “I suggest that the term for conse-
quence is deliberately avoided, because Plato is here presenting the method hypothesis 
as more flexible and also more fruitful than logical inference…. Whatever is incompatible 
with some basic feature of the model, as specified in the hypothesis, will be ‘out of tune’ 
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consistency. If a hypothesis leads to inconsistent consequences, then it is sup-
posed to be false: ‘if anyone should question the hypothesis itself, you would 
ignore him and refuse to answer until you could consider whether its conse-
quences were mutually consistent (συμφωνεῖ) or not (διαφωνεῖ)’ (Phd. 101d3-5, 
tr. Rowe). If the consequences are not mutually consistent, then the hypothesis 
is false and has to be rejected.
But consistency or ‘concord’ is only a negative test of truth.38 Nevertheless, 
we can ask the question which remains open: logoi or theories may be consis-
tent or harmonious like a piece of music, but are they also true in the sense 
of corresponding to reality? Mere consistency is for the Platonic Socrates not 
yet by itself a guarantee of truth: ‘if your premise (ὑπόθεσις) is something you 
do not really know and your conclusion and intermediate steps are a tissue 
(συμπέπλεκται) of things you do not really know, your reasoning may be consis-
tent with itself (ὁμολογία),39 but how can it amount to knowledge (ἐπιστήμη)?’ 
(R. 533c5-6, tr. Cornford; cf. Cra. 436c7-d7). What is said here from mathemati-
cal hypotheseis, which the mathematicians laid down as ‘known’ (R. 510c6) and 
treat as absolute or non-hypothetical assumptions, seems to me valid in an 
analogous way also to the hypothesis of ideas (cf. Phd. 100b1-9). If the hypoth-
esis of ideas is laid down as something much ‘talked about’ (τὰ πολυθρύλητα, 
Phd. 100b5), it is therefore not yet true, even if it finds the consensus of the 
interlocutors and its consequences are mutually consistent.
In fact, we find in Plato not only consensus (ὁμολογία, cf. Grg. 487e6-7) or 
consistency (συμφωνία) as a criterion of truth (Phd. 100a4-7), but also corre-
spondence: ‘a true logos says that which is, and a false logos says that which 
is not’ (Cra. 385b7-8; cf. Sph. 263b3-7). “The [true] statement as a whole is 
(diaphônein) or fail to accord. But the positive relationship of ‘being in accord’ (symphô-
nein, synâidein) is not mere consistency. It means fitting into the structure, bearing some 
positive relationship to the model by enriching or expanding it in some way”. This point 
has been further developed by Bailey 2005, esp. 104-110, by accentuating the musical con-
nection of “being in accord”, a point made also by Stefanini 1949, 258: “Il criterio della 
verità, è, adunque, la legge stessa della musica: armonia. Ciò che resta fuori dell’euritmia 
universale è ad un tempo dissonante e falso”.
38   Cf. Robinson 1953, 135-136: “‘Seeing whether the results accord’, considered as a test, is 
merely negative. It can sometimes show that the hypothesis must be abandoned, but 
never that it must retained”. Cf. Leibniz, 1980, 294: “Cum ergo causas rerum ex optimi 
electione sumptas, neque ipse per me consequi, neque ab alio me discere posse viderem, 
velut secunda navigatione instituta aliud ingressus sum iter, quod si non omnia explicet, 
nihil tamen patiatur dici falsum” (“… after establishing something like a second voyage 
I did enter another path which, if it does not explain everything, does not tolerate that 
something false is said” (my translation).
39   ὁμολογία may mean consensus or consistency. Cf. the remarks to ὁμολογουμένως (R. 510d2) 
in Ferber 1989, 96, where I plea rather for consensus.
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complex and its structure corresponds to the structure of the fact”.40 In the 
same vein, we could say: a true hypothesis says that which is, and a false one 
says that which is not.
If the Socrates of the Phaedo tries to investigate ‘in the logoi’ ‘the truth of 
things’, he tries to arrive by his flight into the logoi at the reality of things. 
Therefore, [S3] seems to indicate that, nevertheless, mere consistency is by it-
self a guarantee of truth no less than correspondence is.
Metaphorically speaking, the second sailing is no less a method to arrive at 
the goal—‘the truth of things’—than is the first; or the rowing boat is no less a 
vehicle to get to the final destination than is the sailing boat. Or to put it differ-
ently again: by dreaming—as sometimes Socrates does (cf. Smp. 175e2-3; Cra. 
439c6-d; Phd. 60e1-61a4)—we may arrive at reality as in a state of wakefulness, 
whereas by seeing with our eyes we are blinded—at least if our dreams are 
consistent.
To use the metaphor which the Platonic Socrates uses in the Republic: by 
distinguishing the essence of the Good from everything else and ‘surviving 
like in a battle all attacks of refutations’ (ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῃ διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων 
διεξιών, R. 534c1-2, free tr. Ferber) with a ‘logos not liable to fall’ (ἀπτῶτι τῷ λόγῳ, 
R. 534c3), the philosopher-kings and -queens not only survive all attacks 
with an infallible or irrefutable logos, but they are ‘brought at last to the goal’ 
(R. 540a6), namely ‘to lift up the eye of the soul to gaze on that which sheds 
light on all things’ (R. 540a7-9), that is, ‘the Good itself ’ (R. 540a8-9), a ‘prin-
ciple which is not a hypothesis’ (ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος, R. 510b7) to which the ‘some-
thing sufficient’ (τι ἱκανόν, Phd. 101e1) may allude.41
This is quite an astonishing claim. The question was in principle aptly for-
mulated by Davidson:
Consistency is, of course, necessary if all our beliefs are to be true. But 
there is not much comfort in mere consistency. Given that it is almost 
certainly the case that some of our beliefs are false (though we know not 
which), making our beliefs consistent with one another may as easily re-
duce as increase our store of knowledge.42
In fact, the flight into the logoi takes the risk that some of the logoi—or even 
the logos judged to be the ‘strongest’ (Phd. 100a4), that is, the ‘hardest to refute’ 
40   Cornford 1935, 311.
41   Cf. Gallop 1975, 190-191. This is nevertheless a disputable issue, cf. Verdenius 1958, 231; 
Ferber 1989, 100.
42   Davidson 2005, 223.
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(δυσεξελεγκτότατος, Phd. 85c9-d1)—are false. Now the method with which the 
Platonic Socrates takes refuge in the logoi in the Phaedo is the method of math-
ematics known from the Meno as the method of hypothesis (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, 
Men. 86e3). But in the Phaedo, it is neither a mathematical hypothesis that is 
put forward (cf. Men. 85b7-86d2) nor the hypothesis that virtue is a science (‘if 
virtue is a science, then it would be teachable’, Men. 87c5-6). It is the hypothesis 
that ideas exist where ‘is’ has the emphatic Parmenidean meaning of being real 
or really real (ὄντως ὤν).43
My aim is to try to show you the kind of reasons that engage me, and 
for that purpose I’m going to go back to those much-talked-about enti-
ties (πολυθρύλητα) of ours—starting from them, and hypothesizing that 
there’s something that’s beautiful and nothing but beautiful, in and by 
itself, and similarly with good, big, and all the rest. If you grant me these, 
and agree that they exist, my hope is, starting from them, to show you 
the reason for things and establish that the soul is something immortal.44
The reasoning is roughly this: if the hypothesis of ideas is true, then the soul 
is immortal. Not only does the theory of ideas depend on a hypothesis, but 
the final proof of the immortality of the soul also depends on a hypothesis, the 
hypothesis of ideas (Phd. 100b7-9).45 So the immortality of the soul is, like the 
theory of ideas, ‘something necessary because of a hypothesis’ (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως 
ἀναγκαῖον, cf. Arist. PA 1.1, 642a9).
But in the short time before his death—‘as long as there is still daylight’ 
(Phd. 89c7-8)—the Platonic Socrates cannot do what the Platonic Parmenides 
does later in the Parmenides: to consider the consequences of the negations of 
his hypothesis, namely ‘if that same thing is hypothesized (ὑποτίθεσθαι) not to 
be’ (Prm. 136a1-2). What are the consequences if ‘the beautiful, the good and 
every such reality’ (Phd. 76d8-9) are hypothesized not to be? In fact, concern-
ing the pre-existence of the soul Socrates assumes: if these realities do not 
exist, then would not this argument be altogether futile (cf. Phd. 76e4-5)?
But how without this time-consuming ‘exercise’ (Prm. 135c8, 135d4.7, 136c5) 
does the Platonic Socrates know that his hypothesis of the individual ideas is 
not false as a hypothesis (cf. Arist. APr. 62b12-20)—as other hypotheses of him 
have been proven false (cf. Arist. Pol. 2, 1261a16, 1263b29-31)—or, even worse, 
43   Cf. for the influence of Parmenides in the Phaedo Hackforth 1955, 84-85.
44   Phd. 100b1-9, tr. Rowe.
45   Cf. Sedley 2018, 210-220.
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idle talk (ἀδολεσχία, cf. Phd. 70c1, Prm. 135d5, Tht. 195b10; κενεαγορία, R. 607b7), 
as commonly assumed?
In fact, Plato’s first interpreter, Aristotle, will say that the πολυθρύλητα—the 
Platonic ideas—are τερετίσματα (APo. 1.22, 83a33), that is, twitters, and to speak 
of ideas as paradigms and participating is κενολογεῖν, ‘idle talk’ (cf. Metaph. 1.9, 
991a21-22). Aristotle refers with this critique clearly to the δεύτερος πλοῦς of the 
Phaedo (cf. Metaph. 1.9, 991b3-7); already Aristotle’s remark ‘… [Plato’s] intro-
duction of the Forms (ἡ τῶν εἰδῶν εἰσαγωγή), was due to his inquiry in the logoi 
(τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγένετο σκέψιν), for the earlier did not partake in dialectic …’ 
(Metaph. 1.6, 987b31-33) is “pretty clearly a reminiscence” of Phd. 99e5-100a4.46 
In De generatione et corruptione, Aristotle explicitly attributes the theory not to 
Plato, but to the Platonic Socrates, that is, ‘the Socrates in the Phaedo’ (ὁ ἐν τῷ 
Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης, GC 2.9, 335b10-14; cf. Pol. 2, 1261a6).
The answer of Plato’s Socrates on ‘the problem of the Socratic elenchus’ was: 
like Meno’s slave we have hidden in us true opinions (cf. Men. 81a-d, 85b-86b), 
because we are ‘fallen souls’, for ‘the truth of things is always in our soul’ (Men. 
86b1). Davidson thus writes in his article ‘Plato’s Philosopher’:
[T]he assumption is that, in moral matters, everyone has true beliefs which 
he cannot abandon and which entail the negations of his false beliefs. It fol-
lows from this assumption that all the beliefs in a consistent set of beliefs 
are true, so a method like the elenchus which weeds out inconsistencies 
will in the end leave nothing standing but truths.47
In the same vein, the Platonic Socrates could say in the Phaedo, evoking the 
Meno: everyone has hidden true beliefs about the universals like ‘the equal’ (cf. 
Phd. 74a5-75a3). Although ‘the equal’ seems to belong to the metaxy between 
Ideas and sense phenomena (cf. Arist. Metaph. A6 987b14-18),48 as Socrates 
uses also the plurals ‘the equals themselves’ (αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα, Phd. 74c1) and ‘the 
three’ (τὰ τρία, Phd. 104e1), the ‘equal’ is nevertheless a universal like ‘the beau-
tiful, the good and every such reality’ (Phd. 76d8-9). But at the end of the day 
this hypothesis will remain true because an examination of it would leave real-
ism about the universals like the equal and ‘the beautiful, the good and every 
46   Cf. Ross 1924, vol. 1, 171, and now the careful article of Delcomminette 2015.
47   Davidson 2005, 229.
48   Cf. Wippern 1970, 276-277: “Die Lösung dieser Aporie kann von Platon aus gesehen nur 
darin liegen, dass jedenfalls die Seele und die scheinbar nur der Exemplifikation dienen-
den partikulären ‘Ideen’ der μονάς, δυάς, τριάς oder der πεμπάς eine Art Zwischenstellung 
zwischen dem Reich der absoluten εἴδη selbst und der sinnlich wahrnehmbaren Dinge 
innehaben”. Cf. also Wippern 1970, 277 n. 14; Schiller 1967, 57-58; and Ross 1924, 194 ad loc.
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such reality’ as the only viable option about the universals. We arrive through 
the δεύτερος πλοῦς at reality as through the πρῶτος, because in us there are true 
opinions about the universals, which entail negations of the false opinions 
and cannot be shaken or are elenchus-resistant, but must be made explicit by 
cross-examination.
Metaphorically, we can give the answer in the following way: the rowing 
boat has in itself a sail, which can be hoisted; that is, by τὸ σκοπεῖν ἐν λόγοις, 
we arrive at the ἀλήθεια τῶν ὄντων. Or, to use another metaphor: our soul as 
the ‘place of ideas’ (τόπος εἰδῶν, Arist. De an. 3.4, 429a27-28)49 is a mirror of the 
truth, but has in its incarnated form to be purified from its hidden contradic-
tions by an examination of the logoi until it can see the unveiled truth.
Again, in the same vein, Socrates could say: everyone has hidden true beliefs 
about his soul and its destiny after his death, for example that the soul brings 
life (φέρουσα ζωήν, cf. Phd. 105d3-4; Cra. 399d11-e2; Lg. 895c11-12) ‘whenever it 
exists’ (ὅτανπερ ᾖ, Phd. 103e5),50 which entail the negations of his false beliefs, 
for example that the soul dies with the body. The hypothesis of the immortality 
of the soul will remain true at the end, because an examination of this hypoth-
esis would leave it as the only elenchus-resistant and viable option.
And only now are we finally able to disentangle the kernel of truth in the 
‘standard interpretation’ according to which the student of logoi considers the 
‘truth of things’ in images: logoi or theories may become images of ‘the truth 
of things’ in the sense of the correspondence theory only when purified from 
their hidden contradictions. But they are then no longer εἰκασίαι, that is, con-
jectures through images, or through images of images (cf. R. 511e2, 534a1-5; cf. 
also R. 598b6-8), but express at least true beliefs which say that what is.
I use the expression ‘true beliefs’, not ‘knowledge’, because there is in the 
Phaedo a caveat: as long as our soul is in a body, we may come in the best case 
as near as possible or ‘very near’ (ἐγγύτατα, Phd. 65e4, 67a3; cf. ὁμοιότατον, 80b3 
with ἐγγύς τι τούτου, 80b10) to the truth about the destiny of our soul, but it 
remains at a ‘distance’ from the truth—caused by our corporeality. There is a 
distance between pure knowledge, which would imply complete consistency 
of our belief system, and the closest approach to this knowledge in life, which 
is not possible to be bridged by a ‘by-way’ or ‘short cut’ (ἀτραπός, Phd. 66b4):
[If] it’s impossible to get pure knowledge of anything in the company of 
the body, then one or the other of two things must hold: either knowledge 
49   Cf. Ferber 2007, 183.
50   Cf. for the remarks “whenever it exists” (ὅτανπερ ᾖ, Phd. 103e5) the neglected, but perti-
nent, remarks of Wippern 1970, 273-274.
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can’t be acquired, anywhere, or it can be, but only when we’re dead; be-
cause that’s when the soul will be alone by itself, apart from the body, and 
not until then.51
If this principle is applied to the soul, it is impossible to acquire pure knowl-
edge of its immortality in the company of the body, that is, in this life, although 
it may be possible to attain different degrees of approximations, depending 
on the progressive degrees of separation from the body (cf. Phd. 67a2-3).52 
But only after death, that is, after our excarnation, would we not only believe, 
but really know that we are immortal, if we are after death—paradoxically 
speaking—still alive.
This human impossibility to arrive at pure knowledge seems to remain true 
for Plato right up to the digression in the 7th letter ‘because of the weakness of 
the logoi or arguments’ (διὰ τὸ τῶν λόγων ἀσθενές, Ep. 7, 343a1)53—a corollary 
of the ‘human weakness’ (ἀνθρωπίνη ἀσθένεια, Phd. 107b1; cf. Lg. 853e10-854a1; 
Plt. 278c9-d6) caused by the incarnation of our souls. To this ‘human weakness’ 
also the δεύτερος πλοῦς in the Philebus may allude: ‘but while it is a great thing 
for the wise man to know everything, the second best voyage (δεύτερος πλοῦς) 
is not to ignore oneself, it seems to me’ (Phlb. 19c1-3, tr. Frede with modifica-
tion). This körperliche Verdüsterung of our soul—to use an expression of old 
Goethe54—may remain true even in the ‘so called unwritten doctrines’ (Arist. 
Ph. 209b14-15) if old Plato has said there: “Not only the happy (eutychounta) 
but also the proving (apodeiknynta) human being (cf. Phd. 77a5, b2-3, c2-6, d4, 
87a4-c4, 105e8) must remember that he is a human being”.55
 3
Phd. 99e4-100a3 belongs to the ‘autobiographical pages’ of Plato’s Socrates. 
These pages have been called the “ancient counterpart of Descartes’ Discours 
de la Méthode pour bien conduire sa raison”.56 Thus, for example Gallop writes: 
51   Phd. 66e4-67a2.
52   Cf. Fine 2016, 563-564.
53   Cf. Ferber 2007, esp. 56-66, 106-120. The interpretation of Burnyeat/Frede 2015, 121-132 
does not take into account this discussion. Cf. now inter alia the critique of Burnyeat/
Frede by Szlezák 2017, 311-323, esp. 318-320.
54   Talks with Eckermann, March 11, 1828.
55   Gaiser 1963, 455, Testimonium 11.
56   Taylor 1936, 200 n. 1: “The autobiographical pages of our dialogue are thus the ancient 
counterpart of Descartes’ Discours de la Méthode pour bien conduire sa raison with the 
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“Like Descartes, Socrates professes to be confused by the senses and to aban-
don their use. Both are pioneers of a new philosophical method. Both seek 
metaphysical foundations for mathematics and natural sciences. And both for-
mulate basic certainties that fortify their religious convictions”.57
Here we may go a step further by comparing the ‘final proof’ for the im-
mortality of the soul with Descartes’ ontological argument for the existence of 
God. The ‘final proof’ extends from Phd. 105c9-107a1 and consists of two parts, 
a first sub-proof that the soul, since it is the cause of life in the body, is immor-
tal (Phd. 105c9-e7), and a second sub-proof that the soul, since it is immortal, is 
indestructible (Phd. 105e10-107a1). The second sub-proof has also been called 
the ‘ultimate final proof’;58 I call the first sub-proof the penultimate one.
The penultimate draws the conclusion: ‘In that case soul (ψυχή) is some-
thing deathless—immortal’ (Phd. 105e6, tr. Rowe). The ‘ultimate final proof’ 
draws the conclusion: ‘“there’s nothing clearer, then, Cebes”, said Socrates, 
“than that soul is something immortal and imperishable (ψυχὴ ἀθάνατον καὶ 
ἀνώλεθρον), and that really and truly our souls will be there in Hades (τῷ ὄντι 
ἔσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν Ἅιδου) after all”’ (Phd. 106e8-107a1, tr. Rowe). So the 
premises of the final proof are the hypotheses of the individual ideas (see 
above) and the conclusion is (a) soul (ψυχή) is something deathless/immortal 
and (b) indestructible and (c) our souls will indeed be in Hades.
After Frede (1978) and Denyer (2007), Sedley (2018) has made a new—and 
as far as I know, the best available—attempt to show the validity of this con-
clusion, given the premises.59 In the following, I will not dare to make another 
new attempt to show the validity of this conclusion, but I will try to show that 
the ‘final proof’ for the immortality of the soul shares with the ontological ar-
gument for the existence of God the same structure in the following sense: by 
σκοπεῖν ἐν λόγοις, we are supposed to arrive at the ἀλήθεια τῶν ὄντων. But if this 
is true, it shares also one of the problems.
I quote here from the penultimate final proof only the following lines:
“Well now, what do we call that which does not admit death?”
“Deathless/immortal [athanaton].”
“Does soul not admit death?”
interesting differences, (1) that though both philosophers are concerned to simplify phi-
losophy by getting rid of a false and artificial method, Descartes’ object is to revive the 
very ‘mechanical’ interpretation of nature which Socrates rejected, and (2) that Socrates 
left it to the piety of another to do for his mental history what Descartes did for himself”.
57   Gallop 1975, 169.
58   Cf. Pakaluk 2010, 643-677.
59   Sedley 2018, 221-220. Cf. also Frede 1978 and Denyer 2007.
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“No.”
“Then soul is something deathless/immortal?” “It is something 
deathless/immortal.”
“Well now,” said Socrates, “are we to say that this has been proved? What 
do you think?”
“Yes, and most sufficiently, Socrates.”60
This argument has a certain affinity with the ontological argument used by 
Descartes in his Discours de la Méthode (AT VI, 36) and his 5th Meditation on 
First Philosophy.61 I prefer Descartes’ version of the ontological argument be-
cause it has more affinity with the final proof than does Anselm’s. Like the 
Phaedo, Descartes’ Meditations try to prove the immortality of the soul, as is 
indicated by the subtitle of the first edition (1641) of the Meditations, In qua Dei 
existentia et animae immortalitas demonstratur:62
… from the fact that I cannot think of God except as existing (nisi exis-
tentem), it follows that existence is inseparable from God (existentiam a 
deo esse inseparabilem), and hence that he really exists (revera existere). 
It is not that my thought makes it so, or that it imposes any necessity on 
anything; but, on the contrary, it is the necessity which lies in the thing 
itself, that is, the necessity of the existence of God, which determines me 
to think in this way: for it is not in my power to conceive a God without 
existence, that is, a being supremely perfect, and yet devoid of an abso-
lute perfection, as I am free to imagine a horse with or without wings.63
60   Phd. 105e2-10, tr. Sedley.
61   The first to have made this observation seems to be Nietzsche 1995, 184: “Die letzte [Stufe] 
ist die des ontologischen Beweises, aus dem Begriffe: eine todte Seele ist ein logischer 
Widerspruch”, then Robin 1950, 82 n. 1, quoted in Moreau 1947, 328 n. 1. We find a fuller 
treatment in Moreau 1947, 320-343, esp. 328-329: “la conclusion qu’on cherche à tirer de 
la définition de l’âme suppose une inférence de l’essence à l’existence; en quoi consiste 
précisement une argumentation ontologique”. After Moreau, O’Brien 1968, 95-106, writes 
(here 104): “The conclusion of our unfolding of Plato’s argument would be that many 
things may exist: but that one thing, soul, always and so necessarily or essentially exists. 
In this the complete explication of Plato’s argument leads us to something like the notion 
of a necessary being, a necessary being of the kind that is required as the object of the 
so-called ontological argument for the existence of God”. But the analogy is not so much 
the analogy with a necessary being, but with a being whose existence is enclosed in its 
perfection.
62   In fact, the Meditations arrive only at a premiss for the proof of the immortality of the 
soul (cf. AT VII, 5-6) by proving its “real distinction” from the body (AT VII, 71), cf. 
Ebert 1992, 189.
63   AT VII, 67, tr. Veitch/Cottingham.
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The analogy consists in the following: as the penultimate proof for the ex-
istence of an immortal soul concludes from the meaning of the expression 
‘soul’ or ψυχή that a soul does not admit death and is—after the ‘ultimate final 
proof’—indestructible (cf. Phd. 106d5-7),64 so, too, does the ontological argu-
ment conclude from the meaning of the word ‘God’ as implying ‘existence’ in 
the sense of a perfection that God exists and is real (existentiam a Deo esse 
inseparabilem, ac proinde illum revera existere, AT VII, 67). But when God re-
ally (revera) exists, his existence is also indestructible. Thus, it would be a con-
tradiction to think of God—that is, a supremely perfect being—as lacking real 
existence and being destructible, because he would then lack perfection and 
not be a supremely perfect being, just as it is a contradiction to think of an im-
mortal and indestructible soul as mortal and destructible. Both proofs try to 
prove the real existence of something—in one case the real existence of God 
and in the other case the real existence of an immortal soul—by the method 
of a σκοπεῖν ἐν λόγοις. By a σκοπεῖν ἐν λόγοις, we are supposed to arrive at the 
ἀλήθεια τῶν ὄντων. In Kantian terms: both propositions—‘God exists’ and ‘The 
soul is immortal’—are on the one hand analytic, and their negations—‘God 
does not exist’ and ‘The soul is mortal’—therefore false. On the other hand, 
they presume to give substantive information about reality.
The ‘ultimate final proof’ is in this sense the ontological argument for the 
immortality of the soul. Both ontological arguments try to prove the extramen-
tal and indestructible reality of something by analytic propositions: Plato’s 
Socrates tries to prove the indestructible reality of the soul, Descartes the (in-
destructible) reality of God. In contrast to Kant’s opinion that analytic judg-
ments do not enlarge our knowledge,65 both ontological arguments presume 
to enlarge our knowledge. The difference lies in this: whereas nowhere in the 
Phaedo does Socrates consider the possibility that he or his interlocutors lack 
a soul in life, Descartes assumes God’s non-existence.
Now we may also understand better what the meta-physical turn of the 
Platonic Socrates consists in. It is not the turn from synthetic propositions that 
can be false to synthetic propositions a priori which presume to be always true 
about things of which no experience is possible, but to analytic propositions 
a priori which are always true or ‘safe’ (Phd. 100e1). But these analytic propo-
sitions enlarge our knowledge.66 Whereas the ‘safe’ (ἀσφαλῆ), but ‘unlearned 
64   Cf. Pakaluk 2010, 643-677.
65   Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, A 258/B 314.
66   Reale 1997, 153, writes: “Possiamo, in conclusione, affermare che la platonica ‘seconda 
navigazione’ costituisce una conquista che segna, in un certo senso, come abbiamo già 
rilevato all’inizio, la tappa più importante nella storia della metafisica”. He nevertheless 
does not mention this turn from synthetic propositions to analytic propositions, which 
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(ἀμαθῆ) answer’ (Phd. 105c1)—‘through the beautiful, beautiful things are 
beautiful’ (Phd. 100e1-3)—is merely a quasi-tautological truth, the ‘subtler 
(κομψοτέρα) answer’ (Phd. 105c2) involves a third item which always has the 
property, whose presence in particular is what is to be explained: as a thing is 
hot because of fire, so the soul is immortal because soul brings life. It is there-
fore not only a tautological analytic truth, but an analytic truth which teaches 
us something we did not know before: ‘the soul is immortal and indestructible’ 
evidently enlarges our knowledge.
Of course, there remain doubts about both ontological arguments. I cannot 
open the whole battery of arguments for and against these two ontological 
arguments, but confine myself to two counterarguments, one against the onto-
logical argument for the existence of God and one against the ontological argu-
ment against the immortality of the soul, which have nevertheless something 
in common.
Johannes Caterus (ca. 1590-1655), the author of the First Set of Objections to 
the Meditations, writes, for example:
Even if it is granted that a supremely perfect being carries the implica-
tion of existence in virtue of its very title, it still does not follow that the 
existence in question is anything actual in the real world (in rerum natura 
actu quid esse); all that follows is that the concept of existence is insepa-
rably (conceptum existentiae inseparabiliter) linked to the concept of a 
supreme being. So you cannot infer that the existence of God is anything 
actual (actu quid esse) unless you suppose that the supreme being actu-
ally exists (actu existere); for then it will actually contain all perfections, 
including the perfection of real existence.67
This objection is similar to one of the objections of Strato of Lampsacus (ca. 
335-269 bc) against the ‘ultimate final’ proof for the immortality of the soul:
Never can it rashly be accepted that, if the soul does not admit death and 
is in this sense deathless, it is also indestructible: immortal is namely also 
a stone in this way, but it is not indestructible.68
enlarge our knowledge, as made evident by Brentano 1925, 178-179. But cf. Sedley 2009, 
152: “… the necessity that the soul be alive, confer life on whatever it is in, and itself never 
admit death is presented by Socrates as having an intimate relation to the ‘safe’ causal 
efficacy which earlier, in his Second Voyage (Phaedo 99d4-102a3), he attributed to Forms”.
67   AT VII, 99, tr. Cottingham.
68   Wehrli 1969, fr. 123, part h, p. 38, line 31-32; tr. Ferber. Cf. Repici 2011, 433-440.
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Although a stone is not a living being, the example is well chosen to il-
lustrate a weakness of the ‘ultimate final proof’: It proves only that a soul is 
deathless ‘as long as it is alive’ (cf. ὅτανπερ ᾖ, Phd. 103e5), but therefore it is not 
indestructible. In other words: whereas the predicate ‘deathless’ describes—at 
least in the standard post-Kantian and post-Fregean tradition—a conceptual 
or second-order attribute of which we do not have any real experience, the 
predicate ‘indestructible’ describes a real or first-order attribute of which we 
can have real experience like that of a (relatively) indestructible individual 
stone.69 In the same way: if a supremely perfect being carries the implication 
of indestructible existence in the conceptual or—as I prefer to say—semantic 
existence sense, it does not carry the implication of existence in the real or 
the ‘actual’ sense.70 A priori we cannot say what really and individually exists 
or does not exist in the future. But Socrates is finally interested not in the im-
mortality and indestructibility of the concept soul, but of his individual soul, if 
‘really our souls will be in the Hades’ (Phd. 107a1).71
To meet the objection of Caterus, Descartes replies: “But, from the fact that 
we understand [by clear and distinct perception] that actual existence is nec-
essarily and always conjoined with the other attributes of God, it certainly 
does follow that God [really] exists” (AT VII, 117, tr. Cottingham). But Descartes 
leaves the decisive point open about whether the existence of God is an ‘actu-
ally’ real or first-order predicate, or only a conceptually or semantically real or 
second-order predicate of God.
So the question remains: what do these arguments prove, the really real 
(ὄντως ὤν, revera) or only the conceptually or semantically real existence of 
God or of an immortal/indestructible soul? We do not have the reply of Plato 
to Strato, but only of Damascius (ca. 458-after 538 ad) to Strato, who seems to 
have sided not with the Socrates of the Phaedo, but with Strato.72
But if God and the immortal/indestructible soul are only conceptually or 
semantically real—that is, reified thoughts (νοήματα)—would they not pre-
suppose something really real? In an analogous vein: if the Platonic ideas were 
only thoughts (νοήματα), were these thoughts not thoughts of something (τι), 
namely Platonic ideas (cf. Prm. 132b4-c8)? The Platonic Parmenides uses in this 
‘Refutation of Idealism’ or ‘Conceptualism’, in the words of Russell, “a kind of 
69   Cf. Frege 1997, 146, note H: “The ontological proof of God’s existence suffers from the fal-
lacy of treating existence as a first-level concept”.
70   For the distinction between real and semantic existence, cf. Ferber 2015, 151 n. 151. It cor-
responds to that between “existing” (ὑπάρχειν) and “subsisting” (ὑφίστασθαι), represented 
by the Stoics (cf. SVF II, fr. 322, 488, 541).
71   Cf. Centrone, 2012.
72   Cf. Gertz 2015, 255.
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ontological argument to prove the objective reality of ideas”;73 he uses at least 
a proto-ontological argument, insofar as the concept of idea as the ‘thought of 
something’ (νόημά τινος) implies the extramental existence or objective reality 
of this ‘something’—just as the ‘thought of God’ (νόημα θεοῦ) implies in the 
ontological argument the extramental existence of God.
In this sense, Plato reassumes already in the Phaedo the Parmenidean ‘Ur-
Identität’ if we may interpret the fragment τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι 
(DK B3) in this minimal sense that thinking presupposes Being, that is, that 
thinking presupposes something that exists as its object.74 The history of the 
ontological argument seems to be a virtually never-ending story or circle, as 
‘predicted’ by the goddess of Parmenides: ‘it is indifferent to me where I make 
a beginning; for there I come back again’ (DK B5). If we begin with thinking 
we come back again to being, and if we begin with being we arrive back at 
thinking.
In the same vein as the ‘thought of something’, for Plato the concept or rei-
fied thought of an immortal/indestructible soul seems to presuppose an ex-
tramental immortal/indestructible soul if ‘soul’ or ‘soul-stuff ’75 is a general 
or abstract mass noun and denotes an entity which transfers its immortality/
indestructibility to the individual soul. So the main objection to the ultimate 
final proof seems to me not that of Strato, but the step from the existence of 
an immortal and indestructible soul in general—to the future existence of my 
immortal and indestructible individual soul if ‘really our [individual] souls will 
be there (τῷ ὄντι ἔσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαί) in Hades after all’ (Phd. 107a1).76 This 
metabasis of a second-order predicate of which we have no experience to a 
first-order predicate of which we will have experience after our death seems to 
be the decisive mistake in the final argument.
73   Russell 1945, 417: “The real question is: Is there anything we can think of which, by the 
mere fact that we can think of it, is shown to exist outside our thought? Every philosopher 
would like to say yes, because a philosopher’s job is to find out things about the world 
by thinking rather than observing. If yes is the right answer, there is a bridge from pure 
thought to things, if not, not. In this generalized form, Plato uses a kind of ontological 
argument to prove the objective reality of ideas [and the immortality of the soul]”.
74   This interpretation has been defended, e.g. by Shorey 1900, 210-212. Cf. for the relation 
between Plato and Parmenides, Ferber 1989, 38-38, and esp. 71-73.
75   I owe the expression “soul-stuff” to Gallop 1975, 89-90: “For the idea that ‘soul is immortal’, 
merely in the sense that there exists a permanent quantum of ‘soul-stuff ’, would no more 
imply the immortality of individual souls than the notion of a permanent quantum of 
matter implies the immortality of individual bodies”.
76   Cf. already Gallop 1975, 222: “But if ‘soul’ means merely ‘soul-stuff ’, the transition to ‘our 
souls’ might be questioned (see on 64e4-65a3, 90)”.
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This post-mortem existence of our individual souls may at best express a 
‘great hope’ (Phd. 114c9). But if this hope would become true, we are better off if 
we believe in it already in life. In this sense, we can at least draw the normative 
conclusion from the factual conclusion if we modify it in the following way: if 
‘really our souls will be there in Hades after all’, we should behave already in 
life as if (οἷον) ‘really’ (τῷ ὄντι) our souls will be there. This seems also to be the 
teaching of the final myth if we consider it a ‘symbolic hypotyposis’ (Kant)—
that is, a symbolic presentation without corresponding empirical content of 
what the future has ‘... in store for those who have died, and—as we have been 
told since antiquity—something much better for the good than for the bad’ 
(Phd. 63c, tr. Tredennick with minor modifications).77
Be that as it may, the fact remains that both of these ‘ontological proofs’ did 
not convince everybody, and, without a doubt, the final proof for the immor-
tality of the soul did not convince the mature Aristotle when he wrote: ‘… all, 
however, that these thinkers do is to describe the specific characteristics of the 
soul; they do not try to determine anything about the body which is to contain 
it, as if it were possible, as in the Pythagorean myths, that any soul could be 
clothed in any body—an absurd view, for each body seems to have a form and 
shape of its own’ (De an. 407b20-24, tr. Barnes). It is also significant that Plato 
did not return to the final proof of Socrates in the Phaedo for the immortality 
of the soul, but did develop another proof (Phdr. 245c5-246e3), which relies on 
the self-motion of the soul and deduces from this self-motion that ‘it cannot 
have a beginning’ (ἀγένητον) and is ‘indestructible’ (ἀδιάφθορον, Phdr. 245d3-4). 
Aristotle seems not convinced by it either,78 because self-motion is a contra-
dictory concept (cf. Ph. 8.5, 257b26-258a5).
Nevertheless, Plato returned to the topic not only in the Phaedrus, but also 
in the Republic (610e5-611a2) and even in the Laws (cf. Lg. 894e3-895c11, 896a1-
b3), although not in the form of a formal proof. The immortality of the soul 
remained for Plato, as for his Socrates in the Phaedo and Meno (cf. 81a10-b7), 
‘an old and holy saying’ (παλαιός τε καὶ ἱερὸς λόγος, Ep. 7, 335a3) to be obeyed 
although ‘hard to prove’ (δυσαπόδεικτον, cf. R. 488a1).
77   Critique of Judgment, § 59: “All hypotyposis (presentation, subjectio sub adspectum), or 
sensible illustration, is twofold. It is either schematical, when to a concept comprehended 
by the Understanding the corresponding intuition is given a priori; or it is symbolical. 
In the latter case to a concept only thinkable by the Reason, to which no sensible intu-
ition can be adequate, an intuition is supplied with which accords a procedure of the 
Judgement analogous to what it observes in schematism: it accords with it, that is, in 
respect of the rule of this procedure merely, not of the intuition itself; consequently in 
respect of the form of reflection merely, and not of its content” (tr. Bernard).
78   Cf. for a formal reconstruction of the argument in the Phaedrus Ferber 2003, 129.
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Moreover, even his Socrates of the Phaedo seems not finally convinced of 
the premises of his proof when he says to Simmias: ‘… our initial hypotheses 
(τάς γε ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας) [the hypothesis of ideas] really must be examined 
more clearly, even if the two of you do find them trustworthy (πισταί)’ (107b5-7, 
tr. Rowe). The initial hypotheses are the hypotheses of ‘the beautiful, the good 
and every such reality’ (Phd. 76d8-9), that is, the hypotheses of the individual 
Platonic ideas. These hypotheses are in the Phaedo—which is not a ‘science 
of ideas’ (τῶν εἰδῶν σοφία, Ep. 6, 322d5) or even a ‘treatise about Ideas’ (Peri 
Ideôn), but rather a drama or ‘tragedy’ of a ‘man’ (ἀνήρ, Phd. 57a5, 58c7, 58e3; cf. 
Lg. 817b5)79—‘not hypotheses in an unqualified sense, but only to the learner’ 
(Arist. APo. 1.10, 76b29-30). They are hypotheses of the πρωταγωνιστής Socrates 
for two youths (νεανίσκοι, cf. Phd. 89a3), the δευτεραγωνιστής Cebes—the ‘most 
obstinate sceptic among men’ (Phd. 77a8-9)—and the τριταγωνιστής Simmias. 
They act differently in the drama,80 but both finally accept the hypothesis of 
ideas as trustworthy. But when Platonic ideas are presupposed for the exis-
tence of an immortal soul, the theory of ideas needs first to be established. 
Socrates vouches for this hypothesis personally with his intellectual autobi-
ography, and his trustworthiness may be, if not ‘almost the most effective’ (cf. 
Arist. Rh. 1356a13), still an effective means of persuasion. But for this hypothesis 
we find only one “direct argument” in the whole Corpus Platonicum,81 namely 
at Ti. 51d3-51e6.82 The ‘Sticks and Stones’ argument (Phd. 74a5-75a3) presup-
poses the theory of ideas with its use of the emphatic Parmenidean meaning 
of ἐστί (Phd. 75b6), but does not yet prove the theory83 any more than the other 
passages of the Phaedo (Phd. 65d4-5, 76d7-9, 78d3-7, 100b3-7) in a direct and 
formal way. They suggest, rather, that Simmias and Cebes are already familiar 
with it, at least from hearsay (cf. Phd. 76d7, 100b1-3). So the final proof remains 
somewhat in the ‘air’ of the oral history of the early Academy.
In fact, with the metaphor of a ‘raft’ (σχεδία, sc. ναῦς), “literally, ‘improvised 
boat’”84 with which one must sail through life (Phd. 85d1-2), the Socrates of 
the Phaedo indicates not only the instrumental character of the flight into the 
79   It is a merit of Egger 1900, esp. 25-53, unjustifiably ignored, to have shown this in detail; cf. 
now also Casertano 2015, esp. 7-32.
80   Cf. Grünwald 1910; Sedley 1996, 14-21.
81   Kahn 1996, 330. Cf. for an analysis Ferber 1998, 424-430.
82   Cf. Ferber 1998.
83   Pace Forcignanò 2018, 249-254; cf. Gallop 1975, 97: “[The theory of Forms] is, however, 
nowhere defended, but is simply accepted without argument by all parties (65d6, 74b1, 
78d8-9, 92d6-e2, 100c1-2, 102a10-b1)”. Svavarsson 2009, 60: “The argument is not intended 
to establish that there are Forms; their existence is explicitly assumed”.
84   Kanayama 2000, 92.
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logoi as a Hilfskonstruktion, but also of the hypothesis of the theory of ideas—
a Hilfskonstruktion which Plato, too, later on “never asserts to be definitely 
true”.85 It is only ‘something necessary because of a hypothesis’ (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως 
ἀναγκαῖον, cf. Arist. PA 1.1, 642a9): if we distinguish between true belief and 
knowledge, then we must also accept ideas86—at least if we may hear from 
the voice of Timaeus also Plato’s voice: ‘so here’s how I cast my own vote’ 
(Ti. 51d3).
A raft is not a stable vehicle like a sailing or a rowing boat, although it can 
have, like the raft of Odysseus, to which Simmias may allude (cf. Phd. 85d1), 
sails (ἱστία) as well (cf. Hom. Od. 5.259-261). A second voyage on a raft with oars 
and at least one sail (ἱστίον) which can be hoisted may also be an apt metaphor 
for the Socratic δεύτερος πλοῦς in the Phaedo. But for all its instability, a raft 
with oars and one sail is still a better way than swimming without the ‘raft’ of a 
hypothesis through the troubled water, the πόντος ἀτρύγετος of the γένεσις and 
φθορά of our lives. This may be especially the case, if many or most of us, like 
Simmias, can neither find out the truth about the post-mortem destiny of our 
soul in a direct way by our sensory organs—that is, by a ‘πρῶτος πλοῦς’—nor 
rely on a presumed divine utterance.87
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 Appendix
 Translations of Phd. 99e4-100a3
Quapropter operae pretium esse censui, ut ad rationes confugerem, atque in illis rerum 
veritatem considerarem. Forte vero nostra haec similitudo non omni ex parte congru-
at. Non enim prorsus assentior, eum, qui res in rationibus contemplatur, in imaginibus 
aspicere potius, quam qui in operibus intuetur. (Marsilio Ficino)
So I thought I should take refuge in theories, and study in them the truth of the 
things that are. Perhaps my comparison is, in a certain way, inept; as I don’t at all admit 
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that one who examines in theories the things that are is any more studying them in 
images than one who examines them in concrete. (D. Gallop)
So I decided that I should take refuge in theories and arguments and look into the 
truth of things in them. Now maybe in a way it does not resemble what I’m compar-
ing it to. For I don’t at all accept that someone who, when studying things, does so in 
theories and arguments, is looking into them in images any more than someone who 
does so in facts. (A. Long and D. Sedley)
Sondern mich dünkte, ich müsse zu den Gedanken meine Zuflucht nehmen und 
in diesen das wahre Wesen der Dinge anschauen. Doch vielleicht ähnelt das Bild auf 
gewisse Weise nicht so, wie ich es aufgestellt habe. Denn das möchte ich gar nicht 
zugeben, dass, wer das Seiende in Gedanken betrachtet, es mehr in Bildern betrachtet, 
als wer in den Dingen. (F.D. Schleiermacher)
Es erschien mir demnach notwendig, zu den Begriffen meine Zuflucht zu nehmen 
und an ihrer Hand das wahre Wesen der Dinge zu erforschen. Vielleicht trifft mein 
Vergleich nicht ganz zu; denn ich leugne auf das bestimmteste, dass der, welcher die 
Dinge begrifflich betrachtet, sich in höherem Grade einer bildlichen Betrachtungsweise 
bediene als der, welcher sich unmittelbar an die gegebenen Dinge wendet. (O. Apelt)
Es schien mir daher nötig zu sein, meine Zuflucht zu den Argumenten zu nehm-
en und in ihnen die Realität des Seienden zu untersuchen. Vielleicht ist aber mein 
Vergleich in gewissem Sinne unpassend: Denn ich will gar nicht zugeben, dass jemand, 
der das Seiende in Argumenten untersucht, dabei eher in Bildern untersucht als derje-
nige, der es in der Wirklichkeit untersucht. (Th. Ebert)
Voici alors ce qu’il me sembla devoir faire: me réfugier du côté des raisonnements, 
et, à l’intérieur de ces raisonnements, examiner la vérité des êtres. Il se peut d’ailleurs 
que, dans un sens, ma comparaison ne soit pas ressemblante: car je n’accorde pas 
du tout que lorsque l’on examine les êtres à l’intérieur d’un raisonnement, on ait 
plus affaire à leur images que lorsqu’on les examine dans des expériences directes. 
(M. Dixsaut)
Perciò ritenni di dovermi rifugiare in certi postulati e considerare in questi la verità 
delle cose che sono. Forse il paragone che ora ti ho fatto in un certo senso non calza, 
giacché io non ammetto di certo che chi considera le cose alla luce di questi postulati 
le consideri in immagini più di chi le considera nella realtà. (G. Reale)
Juzgué, pues, que era necesario refugiarme en las proposiciones y buscar en ellas la 
verdad de las cosas; por cierto que la comparación de que me sirvo no me parece ex-
acta, porque no convengo de ningún modo que quien examina las cosas en las proposi-
ciones las examina en imágenes más que quien lo hace en los hechos. (C. Eggers Lan)
Opiné, pues, que era preciso refugiarme en los conceptos para examinar en ellos 
la verdad real. Ahora bien, quizás eso a lo que lo comparo no es apropiado en cier-
to sentido. Porque no estoy muy de acuerdo en que el que examina la realidad en 
los conceptos la contemple más en imágenes, que el que la examina en los hechos. 
(C. Garcia Gual)
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